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SITARAMAN’S MISTAKEN CASE FOR  
THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN 
Vanderbilt Law School Professor Ganesh Sitaraman, a close friend and 
former advisor of Senator Elizabeth Warren, does not pull his punches. By his 
title, The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality 
Threatens Our Republic, Sitaraman proclaims two themes that dominate his 
book. He writes, “the number one threat to American constitutional government 
today is the collapse of the middle class . . . Not the polarization of the two 
political parties.” Why? “Because economic inequality le[ads] inevitably to 
political inequality and, as a result, instability, class warfare, and constitutional 
revolution.” 
To say the least, these are alarmist claims. But, sadly, their constant repetition 
is not a substitute for rational argument. Indeed, Sitaraman’s thesis is wrong in 
every key respect. He misunderstands the source of today’s modern discontent 
by overstating the importance of economic inequality (which is currently 
overwhelmed by the frenzied public concerns with gender equality as 
represented by the #metoo movement,1 which now registers close to a hundred 
million google hits), while downplaying political polarization and ignoring the 
decline in overall economic growth attributable to weak property rights and 
extensive government regulation. Further, he wholly misreads the American 
constitutional tradition by insisting, wrongly, that rough economic equality is 
necessary for a sound and stable constitutional order. 
Inequality, polarization, and growth. Political polarization, not economic 
inequality, is the source of the huge divisiveness in the United States today. Fifty 
years ago, people showed little concern if their children married someone from 
the opposing political party. Race and religion mattered much more. Today the 
exact opposite is true.2 The Democratic Party has steadily moved to the left, as 
the progressive wing now led by Senators Warren and Sanders has driven out 
the centrist Clinton-era coalition. Simultaneously, the Republican Party has 
become more ideological, both socially and economically. There is virtually no 
overlap between the two parties,3 making it harder to broker deals attractive to 
 
1 Search Results of “#metoo,” GOOGLE, www.google.com. 
2 Joanna Rothkopf, Study: We Don’t Want Our Kids Marrying Across the Aisle, JEZEBEL 
(Dec. 7, 2015, 4:15 PM), https://theslot.jezebel.com/study-we-dont-want-our-kids-marrying-
across-the-aisle-1746698282 [https://perma.cc/HB86-8M7L]. 
3 The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW RESEARCH CTR., (Oct. 
5, 2017), http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-
grows-even-wider/ [https://pera.cc/Q7R3-JHK9]. 
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the median voter. Think of the wholly partisan votes, both ways, on both the 
Affordable Care Act in 2010 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. 
We can see that ideology matters more than religion or race because the 
visible political cleavages leave rich and poor on both sides of the divide. On the 
Democratic side is a coalition of well-heeled intellectual and professional elites, 
led by such financial heavyweights as Bill Gates, George Soros, and Tom Steyer, 
who count their billions, and minority group members whose income and wealth 
generally fall well below the median. The issues that animate this economically 
diverse group are claims of police brutality, gun control, racial injustice, identity 
politics, environmental degradation, global warming, corporate greed, and yes, 
income inequality—at least as it applies to their favored groups. On the 
conservative side, the Koch brothers neatly counterbalance Gates, Soros, and 
Steyer atop the income scale. Many business and management types have 
incomes comparable to those of the liberal professionals, and large numbers of 
the working class, who share conservative politics, have far smaller incomes, 
which are not offset by major transfer payments. The conservative movement is 
increasingly distinguished by a sense of cultural and intellectual isolation. 
Disdain for progressive cultural elites propelled Donald Trump to the presidency 
in the key heartland states of Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 
These and other voters hated being called “deplorable,” and they could not (and 
cannot) abide the smug and ill-concealed contempt of the progressive elites that 
control so much of the media, universities, and popular culture in which 
diversity, inclusion, and social justice are the minimum conditions for 
intellectual respectability. 
Both sides on this great divide are, of course, uneasy with economic 
inequality. Large numbers of both groups feel they have been slighted or passed 
over during the slow growth of the last decade, from the end of George W. Bush 
presidency to the Obama era. When voters face economic stagnation, they tend 
to polarize. But now that the positive improvements across all sectors of the 
labor market have taken hold,4 there is some hope that we could ease the 
polarization crisis by adopting the very pro-growth market policies that 
Sitaraman rejects in his misguided pleas for the restoration of the middle-class. 
Rather than face the analytical question, Sitaraman fixates on a crisis of his 
own making without bothering to define exactly what the middle class is or why 
it is in crisis. Sitaraman does not even try. The Pew Research Center defines 
middle-class income as between sixty-seven and two hundred percent of average 
family income, roughly $60,000 per year, encompassing around fifty million 
families whose income is between $40,000 and $100,000.5 But even this class 
 
4 Binyamin Appelbaum & Jim Tankersley, The Trump Effect: Business, Anticipating Less 
Regulation, Loosens Purse Strings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2018/01/01/us/politics/trump-businesses-regulation-economic-growth.html. 
5 Kimberly Amadeo, What Is Considered Middle Class?, THE BALANCE (Oct. 28, 2017), 
https://www.thebalance.com/definition-of-middle-class-income-4126870 [https://perma.cc/4 
M4K-SE4M]. 
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is quite heterodox as the two ends of this group lead very different lives. 
However, it seems odd to call the twenty-five percent of families earning 
$100,000 “upper class” when they are closer to the median earner than to the 
one percent, which in turn has little in common with the vastly wealthier top 
one-tenth of one percent. It is therefore very hard to find clean breaks in the 
continuum. But for our purposes, these definitional issues may not matter. 
Certainly, under the heavy labor market regulation of the Obama years, it was 
the more vulnerable workers who suffered the most. 
Unfortunately, Sitaraman confuses wage stagnation with full-blown social 
crisis. Ironically, his devotion to progressive politics blinds him to the true 
factors behind working-class wage stagnation of the Obama years. The road to 
hell is often paved with good intentions, so it is best to lay much of the blame 
on the regressive labor regulation that took hold first in the 1970s in the effort 
to protect vulnerable workers by encouraging unionization, adding teeth to 
minimum wage and overtime regulations, stepping up enforcement of 
antidiscrimination and family-leave laws, and much more. The resulting 
disconnect is palpable. The only way to increase the fortunes of the middle class 
is to remove the shackles of this so-called protective regulation. Yet at no point 
does Sitaraman show the slightest appreciation of the ability of competitive 
markets to improve the lot of all participants. The Obama style of heavy-handed 
labor regulation has at least two dire consequences. The first is that it slows 
down the overall rate of economic growth—growth during the Obama years 
never exceeded two percent on an annualized basis. The second is that by 
making labor more costly, the Obama era regulations induced firms to invest in 
equipment instead of labor, especially low cost labor where it is far harder to 
absorb the regulatory burden. No liberal pieties about the need for income 
equality can undo the enormous damage wrought by the structural policies 
Sitaraman embraces. On this score, whatever objections one has to the Trump 
administration on immigration and free trade—mine are intense6—the domestic 
deregulatory initiatives of his administration have led to an increased annual 
growth rate in the three percent range,7 dramatic increases in all major stock 
market indexes,8 and high levels of consumer confidence,9 which reflect positive 
economic expectations that ripple through the economy. I would expect that 
pattern to continue after the implementation of the tax reform legislation, which 
 
6 Richard A. Epstein, Trump’s Mixed Report Card, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.hoover.org/research/trumps-mixed-report-card [https://perma.cc/9RZ8-YJZW]. 
7 Madeline Conway, Trump Gets Boost as GDP Growth Is Revised Upward, POLITICO 
(Aug. 30, 2017, 11:21 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/30/trump-gdp-
second-quarter-2017-242171 [https://perma.cc/LG2H-TEBC]. 
8 Corrie Driebusch, Everything Went Right for Markets in 2017—Can That Continue?, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2017, 7:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/everything-went-right-
for-markets-in-2017can-that-continue-1514543400?mg=prod/accounts-wsj. 
9 Patrick Gillespie, U.S. Consumer Confidence Remains Near 17-Year High, CNN MONEY 
(Dec. 27, 2017, 11:28 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/27/news/economy/us-consumer-
confidence/index.html [https://perma.cc/A3GJ-RRMN]. 
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for all its flaws in dealing with individual taxpayers, at long last reduces 
corporate taxes to levels that make the United States competitive with other 
nations.10 In economic terms, we are leagues ahead of where we would have 
been if Hillary Clinton had been elected President of the United States. 
The weakness of egalitarian thought. Sitaraman is not only wrong on the 
salience of economic inequality, he also overstates its importance. One reason 
to like economic equality is that, other things being equal, it is a desirable state 
of affairs if we assume, as we should, the declining marginal utility of wealth. 
But other things are never equal, and so, from a dynamic perspective, efforts to 
use giant wealth transfers to secure economic equality stifles the growth that, in 
turn, would allow for the overall improvement of human welfare through greater 
product innovation and higher wages. 
In order to expose the Achilles heel of the strong egalitarian position, do this 
simple thought experiment. Assume there are two individuals (or groups), one 
of which has an income of a hundred and the other an income of a thousand. 
Which of these policies is better: narrow the gap between the two groups by 
raising the bottom to a hundred and ten and lowering the top to five hundred; or 
widen the gap by raising the bottom to a hundred and fifty and the top to twelve 
hundred? The former occurs with strong restrictions on contractual freedom and 
extensive wealth transfers. The latter occurs through voluntary exchange. Note 
that the latter is a strict Pareto improvement whereby everyone is better off than 
before. The former example is not even Kaldor-Hicks efficient because of a 
shrinkage in the overall size of the pie: The winners do not have nearly enough 
to offer hypothetical compensation to the losers. 
The real challenge is to find ways to minimize damage to growth while trying 
to ensure the bottom is not left defenseless in the face of adverse circumstances. 
So every society takes steps, privately or collectively, to protect against various 
forms of catastrophe, usually with only middling success. No one has quite 
mastered the technique for keeping transfer payments down, so they go where 
they are needed the most. But in the midst of that uncertainty it should never be 
forgotten that there are fewer people who face acute danger in a society that 
produces high levels of wealth. Even the least fortunate have more options as 
the demand for labor increases. And the greater wealth of the rich means that 
voluntary means can cover a larger portion of hard cases that arise in troubled 
times. It is, in general, a dangerous view to shrink the overall pie in some, usually 
futile effort, to improve the distribution of social wealth and income. 
The constitutional dimension. All of these issues were not lost on the Framers, 
and Sitaraman is flatly wrong when he thinks that their primary vision was to 
ensure wealth disparities did not grow to unhappy lengths. Quite the opposite, 
they believed in a republican (as opposed to a pure democratic) form of 
government because they feared the tyranny of the masses, which they tried to 
 
10 Matthew Frankel, Your Complete Guide to the 2018 Tax Changes, YAHOO! FIN. (Dec. 
30, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/complete-guide-2018-tax-changes-115200441. 
html [https://perma.cc/LD4T-EMCZ]. 
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guard against in two ways. First, structural protections such as separation of 
powers and federalism. Second, the protection of individual rights, including 
rights to private property and contract, both of which encourage voluntary 
transactions for mutual benefit and block schemes that create cross-subsidies 
through regulation and taxation. When Madison addressed the perils of faction 
in Federalist 10, he stated that “the most common and durable source of factions 
has been the various and unequal distribution of property.”11 He did not pull his 
punches when he lamented “a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, 
for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project.”12 
Those words make it all too apparent that Madison did not think the correct way 
to control factions was to compel transfers from the propertied to the 
nonpropertied, or from creditors to debtors. His view was the opposite. The 
federal government was meant to restrain faction, which is why in the original 
constitutional design, the federal government had no welfare function to 
perform. 
Those days may well be past, but Madison’s concerns remain powerful. A 
system of weak property rights and extensive government regulation that lies at 
the heart of the New Deal constitution is all too often ill-equipped to control 
powerful factional forces. It is those elements, not economic inequality, that 
represent a real peril to national well-being—a peril everyone should remain 
diligently against, lest political intrigue wipe out economic prosperity and 
political stability. Economic inequality does not lead to political insecurity and 
class warfare. Weak property rights and massive transfer systems lead to greater 
poverty and ultimate strife. Sitaraman gets everything backwards. 
 
 
11 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
12 Id. 
